Raymond C. La Charite

The Concept of Judgment in Montaigne Raymond C. La Charite 1968 edition

Many critics seem to consider it inappropriate or unnecessary to ask what Montaigne means by the faculty of judgment. Laumonier speaks of "Ie bon sens, qu'il oppose si souvent a la memoire et qu'il appelle encore 'jugement' et 'entendement', c'est-a-dire la faculte de penser et de reflechir juste. " 1 Our appreciation of what is implied by judgment, that is by Montaigne's notion of judgment, has been delayed perhaps by a too facile acceptance of a so-called synonymity of meaning among the psychological terms used by Montaigne. In a discussion of key concepts in Montaigne, Donald M. Frame has accurately summarized the present situation with regard to our knowledge of Montaigne's notion of judgment and other key concepts: "We all have our hunches, but we need more than that. " 2 For the expression of his interest and concern for the intellectual and moral activities and capabilities of the mind, Montaigne draws upon a broad and elementary semantic field. These primary psychological terms are jugement, entendement, sens, raison, discours, and conscience. Al­ though these words may be used synonymously, Montaigne does seem to maintain certain basic distinctions among them; frequent substi­ tutions of terms must be the result of semantic and ideational differ­ ences. Moreover, the association of several psychological words within a single sentence implies gradations, however slight they may be.