Charles C Campbell

Surprise: The Precursor to Soviet Operational Success Charles C Campbell

Publisher Marketing: This study examines the element of surprise within the context of operational warfare. Specifically, the study examines the degree to which surprise has emerged as the prevalent factor in the shaping of the Soviet Army's organization, force structure, and doctrine. The study also examines the implications that the Soviet emphasis on surprise has for the NATO defense of Central Europe. It includes an assessment as to the likelihood of a Soviet surprise attack and the NATO vulnerability to such an attack. The study concludes that Soviet planners increasingly favor a short-warning, unreinforced attack that denies NATO the warning time that it requires to establish a viable, cohesive, and continuous forward defense. It further concludes that a strategy that provides for a surprise attack that offers the potential for strategic success in a single operational campaign is especially attractive to Soviet planners since it is grounded in historical experience, takes full advantage of Soviet military strengths and capabilities, and exploits NATO vulnerabilities. Lastly, the study suggests a full range of measures that can be implemented to reduce NATO's vulnerability to a short-warning, unreinforced attack in Central Europe. These include increasing the size of NATO's conventional forces in Central Europe; constructing permanently manned field fortifications along the IGB; and implementing a broad range of readiness initiatives.