Reid M. Goodwyn

Israeli-palestinian Conflict: a Case Study for the United States Military in Foreign Internal Defense Reid M. Goodwyn

From the end of the Vietnam War until Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States military did not engage in significant counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The decline in the U. S military's experience in this area is evident in the fidelity of the joint doctrine and service manuals such as Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense and U. S. Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency Operations, contains some detail for planning COIN operations, but is a reprint of Fleet Marine Field Manual 8-2, and is somewhat dated from its original publishing in 1980. Operation Iraqi Freedom has required the U. S. military to relearn the COIN lessons forgotten from campaigns in Central America, the Philippines, and Vietnam. However, as mentioned above, a corps planner will find little guidance in military literature. This monograph seeks to provide that guidance by providing an analysis framework, the theoretical knowledge, and sources of additional guidance. Drawing primarily from academia, this monograph analyzes insurgencies using the familiar METT-TC format to understand an insurgency's motivations, strategies, tactics, targets, and means. It then uses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case study against which the reader may test the theoretical knowledge presented on insurgencies.