Charles D Claggett

Divining the Strategic Environment: Will the Future Allow United States Intervention? Charles D Claggett

Publisher Marketing: In the midst of the United States (U. S) Army's transition from the Legacy to Objective Force several key determinants have been postulated that are driving the process. Among these is the fact the U. S military must continue to prepare to meet a "peer" competitor or other opponent that may emerge sometime in the next several decades. Much has been written regarding the transformation of the U. S military capabilities to continue its dominance on the "conventional" battlefield. Still the force structures of the military seem to continue to focus on the fact that force-on-force engagements between sovereign states as the most important matter for the military. But what has the nature of warfare changed to the point that these systems are incapable of meeting the threat and therefore irrelevant in the future? Is the U. S military preparing for the right fight? Will the conflicts of the future be more consistent with the use of military force for missions that are deemed "non-traditional" by the Cold War paradigm? What that conflict obscured to some extent was the radical expansion of the community of nation-states over the last six decades. The evolving nature of the state system, changing parameters of conflict management/intervention, and a more informed global society has puts the international system in a state of transition. This transition has changed the fundamental ideas when and why a state will choose to intervene. This monograph examines the changing nature of U. S interventionist policy due to information technology and a global social cosmopolitanism following the Cold War. It reviews U. S interventionism following the Cold War as a reflection of traditional U. S foreign policy underpinnings. Emphasis is placed on determining how information technology has expanded the influence of societies in foreign policy decision-making by the state and its impact on military thinking. The monograph concludes that the U. S military must be more prepared to accept Operations