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Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics: The Myth of Neutrality - Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics Christopher Adolph
Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics: The Myth of Neutrality - Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
Christopher Adolph
Economists emphasize the role central banks' independence plays in achieving good economic outcomes. Using game theory and data from dozens of countries, Adolph illustrates that central bankers with different career trajectories choose different monetary policies. Central banks run by former bankers favor low inflation, whereas bureaucrats support low unemployment.
380 pages, 53 b/w illus.
| Medios de comunicación | Libros Hardcover Book (Libro con lomo y cubierta duros) |
| Publicado | 15 de abril de 2013 |
| ISBN13 | 9781107032613 |
| Editores | Cambridge University Press |
| Páginas | 390 |
| Dimensiones | 163 × 238 × 26 mm · 688 g |
| Lengua | Inglés |