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Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations Peter D. Feaver
Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations
Peter D. Feaver
How do civilians control the military? In his book, Feaver proposes a new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the “armed servants” of the nation-state.
400 pages, 38 line illustrations, 15 tables
| Medios de comunicación | Libros Paperback Book (Libro con tapa blanda y lomo encolado) |
| Publicado | 15 de marzo de 2005 |
| ISBN13 | 9780674017610 |
| Editores | Harvard University Press |
| Páginas | 400 |
| Dimensiones | 150 × 228 × 26 mm · 560 g |
| Lengua | Inglés |
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