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Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power - Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Cameron, Charles M. (Columbia University, New York)
Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power - Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Cameron, Charles M. (Columbia University, New York)
Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution.
312 pages, 47 b/w illus. 26 tables
| Medios de comunicación | Libros Paperback Book (Libro con tapa blanda y lomo encolado) |
| Publicado | 19 de junio de 2000 |
| ISBN13 | 9780521625500 |
| Editores | Cambridge University Press |
| Páginas | 312 |
| Dimensiones | 228 × 153 × 24 mm · 480 g |
| Lengua | Inglés |
| Editor de series | Calvert, Randall |
| Editor de series | Eggertsson, Thrainn |