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Architects of Political Change: Constitutional Quandaries and Social Choice Theory - Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Schofield, Norman (Washington University, St Louis)
Architects of Political Change: Constitutional Quandaries and Social Choice Theory - Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Schofield, Norman (Washington University, St Louis)
This analysis builds on earlier theoretical work by Mancur Olson, William Riker and Douglass North. Professor Schofield emphasizes that under some conditions architects of political change can put a new perspective on societal quandaries, such that societies can choose an option that has a better 'probability of a fit choice'.
354 pages, 8 tables
| Medios de comunicación | Libros Paperback Book (Libro con tapa blanda y lomo encolado) |
| Publicado | 5 de junio de 2006 |
| ISBN13 | 9780521539722 |
| Editores | Cambridge University Press |
| Páginas | 354 |
| Dimensiones | 152 × 228 × 20 mm · 484 g |
| Lengua | Inglés |
| Editor de series | Calvert, Randall |
| Editor de series | Eggertsson, Thrainn |